In meeting the objections which are urged against the Bible, it will be our purpose to expose them, in as few words as possible, to the sunlight of truth. The mere cavils of infidel writers may be hastily dismissed, but the most plausible objections shall be considered more at large.
1. It is objected that reason is a sufficient guide in religion, that revelation is therefore unnecessary, and that it reflects upon the wisdom of the Creator, as if he had not at first duly fitted man for the end of his being, and consequently found it expedient afterward to supply the defect.
This specious infidelity, called “deism,” or “the religion of nature,” made its appearance in France and Italy about the middle of the sixteenth century, and was first advocated in England early in the seventeenth century by Lord Herbert of Cherbury. He lays down five primary articles of religion which, he says, are all discoverable by our natural faculties, and contain everything that is necessary to be believed. They are, that there is a supreme God, that he is chiefly to be worshiped, that piety and virtue are the principal parts of his worship, that repentance expiates offense, and that there is a state of future rewards and punishments.
The history of infidelity from this time is, however, a striking comment upon the words of St. Paul, that “evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived;” for in the progress of this deadly error every one of Lord Herbert’s five articles has been called in question or given up. Hobbes regarded our duty to God as a chimera, the civil magistrate being supreme in all things. Shaftesbury denied the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. Hume attempted to overthrow the argument for the existence of God from the frame of the universe, by denying the relation between cause and effect. By some the worship of God has been rejected as unreasonable because he needs not our praises, and is not to be turned from his purposes by our prayers.
And as to future rewards and punishments, philosophy has discovered, since the days of Lord Herbert, that the human soul, being a mere result of organization, dies with the body. The great principle of the English proto-infidel, “the sufficiency of our own natural faculties to form a religion for ourselves,” is, however, the foundation of all these theories; and this being conceded, the instances just given are a sufficient refutation of the objection. Nothing, therefore, can be more absurd than to wrangle about the sufficiency of reason when it has proved itself to be insufficient in every trial. The fact is a stubborn one, and no speculation can set it aside.
Nor does this fact imply a reflection upon the wisdom of the Creator. With us there is no difficulty in accounting for it. We believe that reason, when first conferred, was fully adequate to all the purposes which it was intended to serve; but that it has since been impaired and perverted by sin, which has both darkened the understanding and corrupted the heart. It is, therefore, subject to be led astray by the imagination and the passions, to adopt false principles, and to draw erroneous conclusions.
2. It is alleged, as an objection to the Divine authority of the prophetic Scriptures, that some of the prophecies have failed. The following are the principal instances referred to:
(1.) It has been said that a false promise was made to Abraham when he was told that his descendants should possess the territory which lies between the Euphrates and the river of Egypt. But this objection is evidently made in ignorance of the Scriptures; for the fact is that David conquered that territory, and that the dominions of Solomon were thus actually extended.
(2.) Voltaire objects that the prophets made promises to the Jews of the most unbounded riches, dominion, and influence; but they have lost their possessions instead of obtaining either property or power, and therefore the prophecies are false. But the case is here unfairly stated, for the prophets never made such exaggerated promises. They predicted many spiritual blessings, to be bestowed in the times of Messiah, under figures drawn from worldly opulence and power, which no attentive reader can mistake. They also promised many civil advantages, but conditionally, on the obedience of the nation; and they spoke in high terms of the state of the Jews upon their final restoration, for which objectors must wait before they can determine the predictions to be false.
Moreover, Voltaire should have known that the reverses of the Jews of which he speaks were clearly predicted, and that his very objection acknowledges the truth of prophecy. The promises of the prophets have not been falsified, while their threatenings have been signally fulfilled.
(3.) Paine asserts that the prophecy of Isaiah to Ahaz was not verified by the event. The history of this prophecy, as delivered in the seventh chapter of Isaiah, is this: Rezin king of Syria, and Pekah king of Israel, made war upon Ahaz king of Judah, with the declared purpose of making an entire revolution in the government of Judah, of destroying the royal house of David, and of placing another family on the throne. Their purpose is thus expressed: “Let us go up against Judah, and vex it, and let us make a breach therein for us, and set a king in the midst of it, even the son of Tabeal.” Now what did Isaiah say to Ahaz? Did he say, The kings shall not vex thee? shall not conquer thee? shall not succeed against thee? No: but he said, “It (the purpose of the two Icings) shall not stand, neither shall it come to pass.” Did it stand? did it come to pass? Was there any revolution effected? Was the house of David dethroned and destroyed? Was Tabeal ever made king of Judah? No. The prophecy was therefore perfectly accomplished.
(4.) The same writer attempts to fix a charge of false vaticination upon Jeremiah. He refers to a prediction which the prophet delivered to King Zedekiah, and which is recorded in the thirty-fourth chapter of his prophecies, in these Words: “Thine eyes shall behold the eyes of the king of Babylon, and he shall speak with thee mouth to mouth, and thou shalt go to Babylon. Thou shalt not die by the sword; but thou shalt die in peace. And with the burnings of thy fathers, the former kings which were before thee, so shall they burn odors for thee.”
Mr. Paine alleges that this prediction was not fulfilled; but that the very reverse was the case, according to the eleventh verse of the fifty-second chapter. It is there stated that the king of Babylon “put out the eyes of Zedekiah, and bound him in chains, and carried him to Babylon, and put him in prison till the day of his death.” He asks, therefore, “What can we say of these prophets but that they are impostors and liars?” This, however, can be said in truth, that the prophecy was fulfilled in all its parts. Zedekiah beheld the eyes of the king of Babylon when he was brought before him at Riblah. The king spoke with Zedekiah mouth to mouth when he gave judgment upon him, or, as the margin has it, “spake judgments with him.” He was carried to Babylon. He did not die by the sword, nor did he fall in battle. He died in peace, for he neither expired upon the rack nor on the scaffold; he was neither strangled nor poisoned; he died upon his bed, though that bed was in a prison. It cannot be shown from the history that the prediction in regard to the funeral burnings was fulfilled, nor can it be proved that it was not; but as every other part was accomplished, the fair conclusion is that this was also.
(5.) Mr. Paine quotes also a passage from the twenty-ninth chapter of Ezekiel, where, speaking of Egypt, the prophet said: “No foot of man shall pass through it, nor foot of beast shall pass through it, neither shall it be inhabited forty years.” This, he says, “never came to pass, and consequently is false.”
Now, as the history of Egypt at that remote period is very imperfectly known, it is at least hasty to conclude, even if we had no evidence in support of the prophecy, that it never was accomplished. But that the predicted invasion of Egypt by Nebuchadnezzar did come to pass we have the testimony of Megasthenes and Berosus, two heathen historians, who lived about three hundred years before Christ. This invasion was as devastating in its character as was that of Judea; and we know that the greater part of the inhabitants of that country were destroyed or led captive, and that the land, though not absolutely left without inhabitants, generally remained uncultivated for seventy years. In such circumstances, from the total cessation of all former intercourse between the different parts of the kingdom, it might without exaggeration be said that the foot of man and of beast did not “pass through it,” their going from one part to another on business or for worship at Jerusalem being wholly suspended. And as we have no reason to suppose that Nebuchadnezzar was more merciful to Egypt than to Judea, the same expressions might be used, in a popular sense, in regard to that country.
It is admitted that no period can be pointed out, from the time of Ezekiel to the present, in which there was no foot of man or of beast to be seen in all Egypt for forty years. The language is evidently hyper bolical, and we are not to expect a literal accomplishment of a hyperbolical expression. We only claim for the prediction that it denotes a great desolation; importing that the trade of Egypt, which was carried on by caravans—by the foot of man and of beast—should be suspended for forty years. No one, however, can prove that the prophecy was not so fully accomplished that the expression might be used without violent hyperbole.
3. It is objected that the Bible has a demoralizing influence upon society, and therefore cannot be divinely inspired. In proof of this various facts and circumstances are urged, the strongest of which we will consider.
(1.) It records the failings and vices of some of its leading characters. The fact is not denied; but the objectors suppress what is equally true, that these vices are never mentioned with approbation; that the characters stained with them are not, in those respects, held up for our imitation; and that such things are recorded for our admonition. They dwell upon the crimes of David, and sneer at his being called “a man after God’s own heart.” But they seem not to know that this character was ascribed to David long before he committed those crimes; that, even if this were not so, the language had respect to his qualifications as a king, and not to his moral character, and that those very crimes were tremendously visited by the displeasure of the Almighty. This objection to the Bible has therefore no force in the direction intended, but it furnishes a strong argument in favor of the honesty and sincerity of the sacred writers. Had they been cunning impostors no such acknowledgments of crimes and frailties would have been made.
But what has been the effect of infidelity upon the morals of its advocates? Blount committed suicide because he was prevented from an incestuous marriage; Tyndal was notoriously infamous; Hobbes changed his principles with his interests; Morgan continued to profess Christianity while he wrote against it; the moral character of Voltaire was mean and detestable; Bolingbroke was a rake and a flagitious politician; Collins and Shaftesbury qualified themselves for civil office by receiving the Lord’s Supper, while they were endeavoring to prove the religion of Christ to be an imposture; Hume was revengeful, disgustingly vain, and an advocate of adultery and self-murder; Paine was the slave of low and degrading habits; and Rousseau was an abandoned sensualist, and guilty of the basest actions. Was it ever found that a truly virtuous and humble man was an infidel? Does infidelity abound among the devout, the pure, the modest, and the dispassionate inquirers after truth? Or, are not rather its advocates profane and dissipated, smatterers in knowledge, false pretenders to philosophy and self-conceited speculatists, who, from their imaginary eminence, look down with contempt upon the opinions and pursuits of the multitude.
(2.) The extermination of the Canaanites by the Jews, according to the Divine command, is urged as an act of the greatest cruelty and injustice. But this objection cannot be urged upon the mere ground that it is contrary to Divine justice or mercy to cut off a people indiscriminately, for this has been done by earthquakes and pestilences. What is here ascribed to the God of the Bible, does not therefore contradict the character of the God of nature.
But was it consistent with the character of God to employ human agents in this work of destruction? Who can prove that it was not? Surely no one; and yet here lies the whole stress of the objection. The Jews were not rendered more cruel by their being so commissioned, for we find them much more merciful in their institutions than other ancient nations. Nor can this instance be pleaded in favor of exterminating wars; for there was in the case a special commission for a special purpose, and by that it was limited.
Moreover, the sins of the Canaanites were of so gross a nature that it was necessary to mark them with signal punishments for the benefit of surrounding nations. And the employing of the Israelites as instruments, under a special and publicly proclaimed commission, connected the punishment more visibly with the offense than if it had been inflicted by the array of warring elements; while the Israelites themselves would be more deeply impressed with the guilt of idolatry, and its ever accompanying polluted and sanguinary rites.
(3.) That law in the twenty-first chapter of Deuteronomy, which authorizes parents to bring a rebellious and intemperate son before the elders of the city that, if guilty, he might be stoned to death, has been called inhuman and brutal. In point of fact, however, it was a merciful regulation. In almost all ancient nations parents had the power of taking away the life of their children. This was a branch of the old patriarchal authority which did not all at once merge into the kingly governments which were afterward established. There is reason, therefore, to believe that it was possessed by the heads of families among the Israelites, and that this was the first attempt to control it, by requiring the crimes alleged against their children to be proved before regular magistrates, that the effects of unbridled passions might be prevented.
(4.) The intentional offering of Isaac by Abraham has also had its share of censure. The answer is: 1. That Abraham had no doubt of the Divine command in the case, and of the right of God to take away the life which he had given. 2. That he proceeded to execute the command of God in faith, as St. Paul has stated, that God would raise his Son from the dead. Had this transaction been so stated as to encourage human sacrifices it might be fairly objected to, but here are sufficient guards: an indubitable Divine command was given, the sacrifice was prevented by the same authority, and the history stands in a book which prohibits human sacrifices.
(5.) Indelicacy and immodesty have been charged upon some parts of the Scriptures. We reply, that in no instance is any statement made in order to incite impurity; and nothing throughout the whole Scriptures is represented as being more offensive to God than the unlawful gratification of the senses. It is also to be noted, that many of the passages objected to are in the laws and prohibitions of both Testaments; and as well might the laws of the land be held up as tending to encourage vices of various kinds because they must, in order to prohibit them, describe them with more or less circumstantiality.
We must also take into the account the simplicity of manners and language in early times. We observe, even among the peasantry of modern states, a language on the subject referred to which is more direct, and what refined society would call gross; but greater real indelicacy does not follow.
These cases have been adduced as specimens of the objections which infidels urge against the Scriptures, and of the ease with which they may be met. For others of a similar kind, and for answers to objections founded upon supposed contradictions between different passages of Scripture, reference must be made to commentators. A little skill, however, in the original languages of the Scriptures, and in the times, occasions, and scope of the sacred books, as also in the antiquities and customs of those countries in which the recorded transactions took place, will always clear the main difficulty.
4. It is objected to the Bible that it contains mysteries and doctrines contrary to reason. It has been a favorite practice with unbelievers to institute a contrast between natural philosophy and revelation, the book of nature and the book of God, and to set the plainness and simplicity of the one against the mysteriousness of the other. The ground of all this is an unwillingness to receive as authorized doctrine what is incomprehensible. They contend that if a revelation has been made there can be no mysteries in it; and that to hold things incomprehensible to be a part of it is a contradiction, and fatal to its claims as a revelation.
The sophism here is easily answered. There are many doctrines and duties in which no mystery at all is involved; and as to incomprehensible subjects, nothing is more certain than that a fact may be clearly revealed, as that God is eternal and omnipresent, and still remain mysterious and incomprehensible. The fact is not revealed in a difficult, obscure, or mysterious manner, the only sense in which the objection could be valid. As a fact, it is clearly revealed that these are attributes of the Divine nature; but notwithstanding this clear and indubitable revelation they are still incomprehensible. It is not revealed how God is eternal and omnipresent, nor is such a revelation pretended; but that He is so. The same remarks will apply to the doctrine of the Trinity, and to many other doctrines of the sacred Scriptures.
But if men hesitate to admit incomprehensible subjects as matters of faith, they cannot be permitted to fly for relief from revelation to philosophy, much less to claim that the latter is superior to the former in the clearness of its manifestations. Here too it will be seen that mystery and truth go inseparably together, and that he who embraces facts embraces at the same time the mystery of their causes. For instance, attraction, gravitation, cohesion, electricity, and magnetism are all admitted facts; but though the experimental and inductive philosophy of modern times has led to many discoveries of the relations, and in some cases of the proximate causes of these phenomena, yet their real causes are all confessedly hidden. And here it may be added, that if we turn our attention to the science of mechanics, or even to that of pure mathematics, we will still meet with much that is incomprehensible.
5. Analogical reasoning has made it probable that the planets of our system, and those of others, may be inhabited by moral beings like ourselves. Hence, infidels have argued the improbability that a Divine Person should have been sent into this world for its instruction and salvation, when, in comparison with the solar system, it is but a point, and that system itself, in comparison with the universe, may be nothing more.
Plausible as this may appear, nothing can have less weight, even if only the philosophy and not the theology of the case be considered. The intention with which man is thus compared with the universe is, to prove his insignificance; and the comparison must be made either between man and the vastness of planetary and stellar matter, or between the number of mankind and the number of supposed planetary inhabitants. If the former, we make corporeal magnitude the standard of real worth. It will therefore follow that a mountain is of more value than a man, in proportion as its magnitude is greater than his; that the smaller the disproportion between the man and the mountain, the less would be the relative insignificance of the former; and that if the smaller object be increased in magnitude, its dignity must be proportionately increased in the true nature of things. The Irish giant, therefore, whose altitude exceeded eight feet, would exceed in relative dignity, by the same proportion, Bacon or Newton, whose height did not attain to six feet. But if this is nonsense, then must that also be nonsense from which these conclusions are legitimately drawn.
If we consider the dignity of an intelligent being, and put that in the scale against mere matter, we may affirm, without overvaluing human nature, that the soul of one virtuous man is of greater worth and excellence than the sun and his planets, and all the stars in the universe. Let us not then make bulk the standard of value, nor judge of the importance of man from the weight of his body, or from the size or situation of the planet which is now the place of his abode. If, therefore, man possesses another magnitude, which can be brought to another and different scale of computation, a scale which determines him to be of more value than the material universe, then it would not be irrational to suppose that the highest mountains and the widest regions, and the entire system to which they pertain, may be made subservient to his interests.
Such a scale is that by which the intelligent, moral, and immortal nature of man is to be measured, and which the sacred historian calls a formation “after the image and likeness of God;” a scale but little regarded in the science of mere physics. As soon, however, as the mind clearly apprehends this moral scale of magnitude, and perceives that though man’s present existence is bounded by a very short period, yet his moral nature is unlimited in time, and will outlast all the mountains of the globe, it then perceives, at the same moment, the deceitful character of the objection which was urged with so much apparent humility.
If the comparison of man with mere material magnitude will not then support this effort to effect his degradation and to shame him out of his trust in the lovingkindness of his God, so neither will the argument which may be drawn from the supposed number of other intelligent beings. Their number cannot alter his character; for, though there may be myriads of immortal beings besides himself, yet he is still immortal, and still has his immense capacity for pleasure and for pain. Unless, therefore, it could be proved that the care of God for each of his creatures must be diminished as their number is increased, the argument can have no force. But such a supposition would be a base and unworthy reflection upon the supreme Creator himself, as though he could not bestow upon all the beings he has made a care and a love adequate to their circumstances.
That man is governed by the providence of God none but an atheist will deny; but any argument drawn from such premises as the preceding would conclude as forcibly against Providence as it can be made to conclude against redemption. And if, by a stupendous exuberance of animal, vegetable, and mineral productions, and the wonderful distribution of light and heat, God supplies the means of life and comfort to the short-lived inhabitants of this globe, can it be incredible, nay, does not this consideration render it in the highest degree probable that he has also prepared the means of eternal happiness for beings whom he has formed for endless duration?
There is, however, another consideration, which gives a sublime and overwhelming grandeur to the Scripture view of redemption, but of which infidel philosophers appear never to have entertained the least conception. It is the moral connection of this world with the whole universe of intelligent creatures, and the intention of God to convey moral instruction to other beings by the history of his moral government in regard to man. Intimations of this great and impressive view are found in various passages of the New Testament, and it opens a scene of inconceivable moral magnificence, “to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God.”
—Christian Theology